

# A Multicriteria Approach for Distributed Planning and Conflict Resolution for Multi-Agent Systems

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## Abstract

A multicriteria approach for distributed planning and conflict resolution for multiagent systems is presented in the paper. A graph representation is used to model the plans of each agent and a multicriteria "best" path procedure can be used in order to obtain the "best" path for each agent considering its private and local goals. In our approach private and local goals do not necessarily coincide. A conflict and/or positive cooperation may occur and a detection procedure is triggered as soon as the agents broadcast their "best plans". A negotiation process is then established if necessary. Such a process iterates the use of the graph representation and of the "best" path algorithm to a level including the agents that have to negotiate. The parameters of the multicriteria model used to evaluate the paths are then negotiated or even the model itself. Some open problems conclude the paper.

## Introduction

Distributed planning, conflict resolution and negotiation are central themes of Distributed Artificial Intelligence. This paper treat these three items. Distributed planning may concern either a group of agents pursuing goals which achievement is necessary for the one of a common global goal (multiagent cooperative problem solving) or a group of self-interested agents with different individual goals (planning by multiple agents). In the following, the first type goals will be called "local" goals and the second type ones, "private goals". In the first case, (multiagent cooperative problem solving) agents work as a whole team and are keen to cooperation activity. In the second case (planning by multiple agents) agents are autonomous. There is no overall planning task which has to be solved in close cooperation, each agent wanting to solve its individual problem. In both cases a conflict resolution problem may arise, either between agents' local goals (first case) or between agents' private goals (second case). Conflict resolution may imply a negotiation process among conflicting agents.

In this paper we propose a multicriteria perspective (Vincke, 1992) for distributed planning and conflict

resolution, integrating both points of view of distributed planning. We consider that agents accomplish local goals necessary for global goal achievement trying simultaneously to optimize private goals (interests or motivations). Our approach is based on a planning-negotiation-execution (PNE) cycle similar to coordination process of Martial (1992), but in our approach all agents have the same functionalities. So each agent itself conceives, negotiates and executes its plans (for example there is no coordinator agent to which the agents can transfer their plans or executor which is unable to negotiate about plans). The agents have the possibility to develop plans using a multicriteria model, to evaluate their single actions or their plans using a set of criteria, and to measure how well a plan helps them to reach their goal(s) (local and private) (planning stage). Then plans are exchanged among agents and a cycle of negotiation is initiated in order, either to detect harmful interactions and resolve conflicts or to create "positive cooperation" when two agents discover that a collaboration may improve their goals further than acting alone. Conflict resolution is based on a negotiation process between agents, about the scale of the criteria used, the set of evaluation criteria and the proposed plans (negotiation stage). As soon as the negotiation process provides a solution, generated plans are executed (execution stage).

In this paper sections 2 and 3 represent a brief overview of related works in order to situate our work. Section 4 describes our assumptions and section 5 gives an overview of global process of our approach of problem solving. Section 6 presents our multicriteria planning model, by introducing an example used throughout this paper. Section 7 describes our multicriteria negotiation process used for conflict resolution and section 8 compares related works with ours. At the end this paper evokes some open problems.

## Distributed Planning

### Multi-agent Cooperative Problem Solving

In Durfee (1988), Durfee and Lesser, (1987) coordination mechanisms allow the agents to plan coordinated interactions and to modify their plans in order to improve common performance. The plans are exchanged in order to

allow agents greater access to the anticipated future behavior of others, avoiding also conflicts. In Ephrati et al. (1995) optimal global plan (with arbitrary global criteria) is derived by appropriately combining local optimal plans. The synthesis of the global plan is based on the research of a global utility that may differs radically from individual agent utilities. In Ephrati and Rosenschein (1993), agents incrementally construct a plan that brings the group to a state maximizing social welfare. This is the result of a voting procedure between agents, without having to reveal full goals and preference at each step of group planning, in order to choose the next joint action. Sycara (1989) considers non cooperative interactions where cooperation cannot be assumed but needs to be dynamically induced during problem solving. For that, Sycara proposes a process of persuasive argumentation based on negotiation to purposefully modify the plans, goals, and behavior of other agents to increase agent cooperativeness in order to bring about convergence to a global solution. Multicriteria methodology is implicitly used (maximize a global utility function or use of a social welfare choice function), but in a narrow context.

### Planning by Multiple Agents

Multiagent planning has been approached in several different ways. In such a context separate plans can be combined in a way that avoids interference among the agents executing the plans (Georgeff, 1987). To solve this problem, it is necessary to ascertain, from descriptions of the actions occurring in the individual plans, which actions could interfere with one another and in what manner (Georgeff, 1984). After this has been determined, a coordinated plan that precludes such interference must then be constructed. This plan can be formed by inserting appropriate synchronization actions (inter-agent communications) into the original plans to ensure that only interference-free orderings will be allowed (Georgeff, 1983). In Martial (1992), agents develop their plans autonomously. A communication framework allow agents to exchange their plans and to negotiate about how to resolve the relations (negative or positive) between their plans. Implicitly a multicriteria problem is again settled, but no explicit reference to such a methodology is done.

### Conflict Resolution and Negotiation

In distributed planning, agents (cooperative or self-interested) have only a local view of the overall problem, therefore conflicts may exist among agents' subplans and redundant actions may also have been generated. Conflict generation is also linked to the distributed planning process. The problem implies both conflict detection and resolution. Many researchers have developed different conflict resolution strategies. Most of them have proposed negotiation mechanism for conflict resolution. Zlotkin and Rosenschein (1991) describe a negotiation protocol for conflict resolution in noncooperative domains (where

"negotiation set" might be empty). They consider that even in a conflict situation, partial cooperative steps can be taken by interacting agents. In Sycara (1989) negotiation is an iterative process involving identification of potential interactions between non-fully cooperative agents, either through communication or by reasoning about the current states and intentions of other agents. This process allows the modification of intentions of these agents in order to avoid harmful interactions or create cooperative situations. Other works are these of Conry et al. (1988) which have developed a negotiation protocol for cooperatively resolving resource allocation conflicts, Klein (1991) resolving conflicts generated in the cooperative activity of groups of design agents, each with their own areas expertise, Chu-Carroll and Carberry (1995) proposing a plan based model that specifies how the system (as consulting agent) should detect and attempt to resolve conflicts with the executing agent. These conflicts are generated by the proposed actions and the agents' beliefs. The proposed model provide a mechanism by capturing multiagent collaboration in a recursive cycle of Propose-Evaluate-Modify which allow the conflict detection and resolution by modification of actions and/or beliefs. The multicriteria dimension of the negotiation process is basically ignored in all such approaches.

### Assumptions

Throughout this paper, we make the following assumptions, some of them being the same as in (Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 91):

- A set of agents  $A = \{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_k\}$  is given which we consider as actors of a system  $\Phi$ . All the agents in the system work towards the achievement of a global goal  $o_\Phi$ ;
- *Complete Knowledge*: each agent knows all relevant information;
- *No History*: There is no consideration given by the agents to the past or the future; each negotiation stands alone;
- *Fixed Local Goals*: the agents can negotiate about the scale of criteria evaluation, actions and plans evaluation criteria choice, proposed plans, private goals, but their local goals remain fixed;
- *Bilateral Negotiation*: negotiation is done between a pair of agents;
- *Not Necessarily Utility Function*, individual or global;
- *Not Necessarily Symmetric Abilities*: all agents are not necessarily able to perform the same set of operations; agents can have complementary abilities;

### Planning-Negotiation-Execution Cycle

Our approach is based on a cycle planning-negotiation-execution (PNE) similar to coordination process of Martial (1992). But in contrast to Martial's approach, where agents

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**may have one or several roles among those of coordinator, executor or mediator, in our approach all the agents do have the same functionalities.** Each agent itself conceives, negotiates and executes its plans during the (PNE) cycle (for example there is no coordinator agent to which the agents can transfer their plans or executor which is unable to negotiate about plans). Each agent is completely autonomous, do not necessarily share or know the goals of the other agents and global problem solving has to emerge as a result of agent interactions. So agents have to coordinate dynamically their plans in order to achieve any global goal by trying to optimize simultaneously their private goals. First, the agents develop their "best plans" in parallel. Then, they communicate in order to transfer these plans to each other. During the planning stage agents develop best plans for local and private goals. Agents exchange their plans in order to broadcast their intentions to each other and either to detect harmful interactions (conflicts) or create positive cooperation situations. Conflict resolution or positive cooperation generation are carried out during negotiation process. Negotiation process forces the agents to work towards a global coherent solution, even if some of them are "not sincerely cooperative". The parallel execution stage begins, either when there is no objection on generated plans from all the involved agents (all the agents did agree), or when the negotiation's end occurs. In this paper we will present the planning and negotiation stages but not the execution stage and its related problems (i.e. synchronization of executed actions).

## The Multicriteria Planning Model

### **Definition 1-Local and Private Goals**

To each agent a set of objectives can be associated under the form of a vector  $o=\{o_1, \dots, o_n\}$  where  $o_j$  can be a local or private goal and can be described by either a numerical value or whatever quantifiable event or by a qualitative (symbolic) description. A local goal is necessary for global goal achievement and one or more private goals express(s) agent's motivations. We denote as  $o_q$  the set of goals of agent  $\alpha_q$  ( $o_q$  being the j-th component).

In both domains of research on distributed planning discussed above, agents have either a global common goal or individuals goals. In our approach, we consider that agents accomplish *local goals* necessary for global goal achievement trying simultaneously to optimize *private goals*. The last ones can be inconsistent with their own local goals or with the private goals of other agents. Conflicts may also exist between local goals and resources sharing. We consider a situation where agents have to cooperate to achieve a global goal simultaneously trying to take out as much personal benefit as possible from this situation.

This situation is presented in real world and specially in social organizations where a cooperative work process is performed by individuals with individual interests and motivations (March and Simon, 1958). The individuals involved in cooperative production may have conflicting economic interests and ideological allegiances (Schmidt,

1991). Cyert and March, (1963) consider that an enterprise is made of general individual's coalitions with their own goals. So enterprise's goals appear as the result of a negotiation process between coalitions and between individuals.

The private goals of an agent can be inconsistent with its local goal in the sense where the best actions allowing the local goal optimization for the global good are not necessarily the ones which optimize its motivations. In other words, agent would not have done the same actions for its local goal if it was completely "devoted" to the global success (personal interest sacrifice in front of the collective one's) and if it had no "back thoughts" on what it can win from its cooperation with the others.

### An Example

In this section, we present an example which points out our multicriteria approach and the chosen context. Let us consider a room with a bookcase (C), a table (A) and a heavy piece of furniture (B). This state of the world is presented as: (IN(A), IN(B), IN(C)). Two agents  $\alpha_1$  and  $\alpha_2$  have, as a common goal, to empty this room. This new state of the world will be presented as: (OUT(A), OUT(B), OUT(C)).

The world may be described by the following relations:

- Object characteristics: heavy(furniture); light(table); light(bookcase);
- Possible actions associated on agents abilities: wait(z); transport( $\alpha_1, x$ )  $\wedge$  light(x); takedown( $\alpha_1, x$ ); transport( $\alpha_2, x$ )  $\wedge$  (light(x); transport( $\alpha_2, x$ )  $\wedge$  heavy(x); transport-r( $\alpha_2, x, y$ )  $\wedge$  light(x)  $\wedge$  light(y))
- Private agents' goals: p-goal( $\alpha_1$ , max-profit); p-goal( $\alpha_2$ , min-time);
- In this example, local goals are not clearly distinct. Therefore, we do consider that each agent has to use its abilities in order to achieve the global goal, as far as they have complementary abilities.
- Relation between actions: before(takedown(bookcase), transport(bookcase));

We assume that when  $\alpha_1$  performs an action there is a profit of 1 money unit and when  $\alpha_2$  performs an action loses 1 time unit.




Figure 1: Nil state of the world

### **Definition 2-Actions**

For each agent  $\alpha_q$  a set of possible actions  $A^q$  can be associated  $A^q=\{a_{q1}, \dots, a_{qn}\}$  which can be performed in order to enable the agents to attain its goals.

### Definition 3-Criteria

Consequently each agent is equipped with a set of criteria  $G^a = \{g_{a1}, \dots, g_{an}\}$  each of them corresponding to a goal. In other words  $g_{aj}(a_{qi})$  measures how well the action  $a_{qi}$  helps the agent  $\alpha_i$  to reach its goal  $o_j$ .

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the possible actions for each agent and how they are evaluated following the criteria modeling their private goals.

$\alpha_1$	TR(1, A)	TR(1, C)	TD(1, C)
$C_{11}$	1	1	1

Table 1: Agent  $\alpha_1$  actions and evaluations

$\alpha_2$	TR(2, A)	TR(2, B)	TR(2, C)	TR-R(2, A, C)
$C_{21}$	1	1	1	1

Table 2: Agent  $\alpha_2$  actions and evaluations

### Definition 4-Plans

An agent has to perform a sequence of actions which may have a cumulative effect (of different nature) which may affect one or more goals. Of course different sequences of actions are possible and each of them corresponds to different levels of attainment of the goals. We call any possible sequence of actions a "plan" and we denote it as  $p = \langle a_1, \dots, a_k \rangle$ . Not all plans are individually feasible because some actions may have a condition which has to be fulfilled by another agent.

### Definition 5-Best Plans

A "best" plan is the sequence of actions that enables an agent to attain its goals to the best possible level. From a technical point of view the difficulty consists to the fact that the agent can evaluate any single action through its criteria, while it needs to evaluate plans (which are defined by the actions which belong to them). In the decision theory this problem is known as the "fragmented alternatives evaluation problem" (see Roy, 1985). Unfortunately such a problem has been studied very little in literature. In the following we will use some ideas introduced in Dellacroce et al. (1996).

Consider a directed graph  $\Gamma = (A, N)$ ,  $A$  being the arcs and  $N$  being the nodes. We associate to each action  $a_i$  an arc and to each node a "state of the world" which describes the state of the agent confronted to its goals. Each "state" of the world enables only a limited set of successive actions which are the arcs departing from the node. The source node corresponds to a "nil state of the world" where no action has been performed and which is considered the worst state. The intermediate nodes account for the eventual cumulative effect of a sequence of actions in any way such

as to accumulate rights measured. More formally we associate to each node  $n^k$  an ordered couple  $\langle d^k, s^k \rangle$  where  $d^k$  is the description of the state of the world and  $s^k$  is a vector  $[s_1^k, \dots, s_n^k]$  representing the level of attainment of the agent's goals. Such a level depends from the sequence of actions previously performed, that is from the different paths leading to such a node. In other words  $s_j^k$  represents the  $j$ -th evaluation criterion of the path leading to the node  $n^k$ . Under such a representation the choice of the "best" plan corresponds to the identification of the "best path" on the graph  $\Gamma$ . Figures 2 and 3 present the graphs of possible paths for agents  $\alpha_1$  and  $\alpha_2$ , where the best paths are in dotted lines.




Figure 2: Agent  $\alpha_1$  possible and best paths




Figure 3: Agent  $\alpha_2$  possible and best paths

All possible paths for agent  $\alpha_1$  are equivalent, the sink node been labeled in all cases as couple  $\langle d^s, s^s \rangle$  where:  $d^s = (\text{OUT}(A), \text{OUT}(C), \text{IN}(B))$  and  $s^s_1 = 3$ . On the other hand is interesting to observe that no paths of  $\alpha_2$  graphs is feasible since it can not perform  $TR(2, C)$  or  $TR-R(2, A, C)$  before  $TD(1, C)$ . Under such conditions the best paths are

two (see figure 3) leading to a sink node labeled  $\langle d^*, s^* \rangle$  where  $d^* = (\text{OUT}(A), \text{OUT}(C), \text{OUT}(B))$  and  $s^* = 2$ . Only agent  $\alpha_2$  sink node corresponds to the system's goal, but such an attainment is conditioned by  $\alpha_1$  which is the only agent that can perform  $\text{TD}(1, C)$ .

In this example both paths are computed using the usual shortest (longest) path algorithms (see Deo and Pang, 1984) since the cumulative effect of the actions is additive. Under the more general setting the information available on each arc is a vector of not necessary quantified (or cardinal) evaluations, that is the best path choice is a multicriteria ordinal "best" path problem (this is one of the reasons for which we do not assume that necessarily exists an utility function). This is also a problem which has been studied very little in literature. Hansen (1980) and Henig (1994) present interesting surveys for the multicriteria shortest path problem (but the information is considered implicitly cardinal, therefore efficient paths can be calculated), while Dellacroce et al., (1996), study some new classes of "ordinal best paths", but not necessary under a multicriteria setting. In the following we will not continue on the problem of the best path, since it is out of the scope of the paper. We will make the assumption that each agent is equipped with the necessary algorithms, although large part of them is in NP. An agent  $\alpha_i$  is therefore able to compute a best plan which we denote as  $p_i^*$ .

#### **Definition 6-Coordination Problem**

A coordination problem occurs when the feasible paths of any agent do not lead to a node labeled with the system's goal.

In our example both agents have a coordination problem since their feasible paths do not solve the problem of getting the room empty.

#### **Definition 7-Conflict Situation**

Intuitively conflict situation occurs when an action performed by an agent impedes an action to be performed by another agent or when induces a worsening to another agent's goals. More formally consider the system  $\Phi$ . To each agent we can associate a graph  $\Gamma$ . Given any two agents  $\alpha_x$  and  $\alpha_y$  each of them may compute its best paths  $p_x^*$  and  $p_y^*$ .

A conflict situation ( $p_x^* \perp p_y^*$ ) may occur when:

- $\exists a_i \in p_x^*, a_j \in p_y^* : \varphi_{a_i}(x, k, ...) \wedge \psi_{a_j}(y, k, ...)$

In other words there exist two actions ( $a_i, a_j$ ) belonging to the best paths of  $\alpha_x$  and  $\alpha_y$ , respectively, such that the associated predicates  $\varphi_{a_i}$  and  $\psi_{a_j}$  (each action is a n-ary predicate) have a common extension of variables. In our example the problem exist among the actions  $\text{TR}(1, A)$ ,  $\text{TR}(1, C)$ ,  $\text{TR-R}(2, A, C)$ .

- $\exists a_i \in p_x^* \exists n^k \in p_x^* \cap p_y^* \exists s_i^k s_{ij}^{kx} < s_{ij}^{ky}$   
where  $s_{ij}^{kx}$  indicates the level of the j-th goal of agent  $\alpha_x$  of the node  $n^k$  when reached by  $p_x^*$  and  $s_{ij}^{ky}$  when the same node is reached by  $p_y^*$ ,  $<$  standing for a strict preference relation. In other words the same state of the world can be reached under a descriptive point of view, but with different levels of goals attainment.

The problem arise in our example since the state of the world labeled for instance  $(\text{OUT}(A)$  and  $\text{OUT}(C))$  can be reached with different goal attainment for the two agents.

#### **Definition 8-Positive Cooperation Situation**

A positive cooperation situation occurs when at least two agents discover that the collaboration may improve their goals further than acting alone:

- $\exists a_i \in \Gamma_x \exists p''_y \in \Gamma_\Phi p''_y > p_y^*$   
< standing for a strict preference relation. The condition represents the situation where exists an action among the possible actions of  $\alpha_x$  such that it exists a path  $p''_y$  for  $\alpha_y$  which is better than its best path computed ignoring the other agents.

The positive cooperation situation will not be detailed in this paper, but we consider it will be treated in a similar way than conflict resolution, by negotiation process presented in §7.

## **Negotiation Process and Conflict Resolution**

In the following we will consider only the case where the negotiating agents are "sincerely cooperative" in the sense that they effectively look for a compromise, being available, if necessary, to lose something on their private goals in order to reach the system goal. Generally this may be not always the case. Opposite to "sincerely cooperative" agent, we consider a "not sincerely cooperative" agent, the one which can "bluff" refusing any concession, hoping to force a "sincerely cooperative" agent to do as many concessions as possible and trying to delay its concession as much as possible. It is possible to foresee a negotiation limit due to resources bounds where the system randomly chooses a solution therefore randomly penalizing some agents. This is a kind of "game rule" accepted by each agent, entering the system.

When situations of coordination, conflict and/or positive cooperation occur among two different agents (which have a complete knowledge of  $\Gamma_\Phi$  and of their respective best paths) a negotiation process is established. In order to model negotiation we will again use a graph representation and a multicriteria model. The negotiation process is then structured as follows.

- Establish a negotiation graph concerning the negotiating agents. In such a graph nodes represent always states of the world labeled  $\langle d^*, s^* \rangle$  where  $s^*$  is now the vector of goals of the negotiating agents. Arcs represent n-uples of actions performed in a parallel way by the negotiating agents. Such a graph is constructed using the sub-graphs of best paths of its negotiating agent and solves the coordination problem and the first type conflict situations (common actions) if any. In our example the negotiation graph is represented in figure 4.




Figure 4: The negotiation graph for agents  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2$

- A new multicriteria model can be settled using the union of the set of criteria of each negotiating agent. There exists two possibilities: the first is to use an hierarchical model of preference aggregation (each agent criteria aggregated to a single criterion and so on), the second is to use a flat model considering all the criteria contemporaneously. The choice depends on the nature of the criteria and the agent's preferences. The first negotiation step consists in trying to define a compromise solution among the efficient paths of the negotiation graph. Different procedures can be used as establishing a global utility function (if the agents accept establish trade-offs among their criteria), go through direct pairwise comparisons (if the agents accept to simply compare their criteria) and so on. In our example the efficient paths are:

1.  $(TR(1, A), TR(2, B)), (TD(1, C), W(2)), (TR(1, C), W(2))$
2.  $(TD(1, C), TR(2, B)), (TR(1, A), TR(2, C))$
3.  $(TD(1, C), TR(2, B)), (TR(1, C), TR(2, A))$
4.  $(TD(1, C), TR(2, A)), (TR(1, C), TR(2, B))$

For example if a trade-off is accepted such that each time unit is equivalent to 0.2 unit of profit the path 1 is the best one.

- A second negotiation step, in the case the first fails to find a compromise solution, is to re-discuss the model enhancing or contracting the criteria set. Under the new model a negotiation as in the first step can hold. In our example each agent could introduce a cost function such that the following tables 3 and 4 hold. Such a cost function could be introduced because the agents realize to use a common resource which is limited.

$\alpha_1$	TR(1, A)	TR(1, C)	TD(1, C)
$C_{11}$	1	1	1
$C_{12}$	2	1	1

Table 3: New criteria set for agent  $\alpha_1$

$\alpha_2$	TR(2, A)	TR(2, B)	TR(2, C)	TR-R(2, A, C)
$C_{21}$	1	1	1	1
$C_{22}$	0,5	1	0,2	1

Table 4: New criteria set for agent  $\alpha_2$

- A third step, in the case the two previous fail, is to change again the model introducing new actions which were not previously considered. If such a situation occurs the criteria set has also to be redefined. The negotiation goes back to the first step and the whole process restarts. In our example a new action that can be introduced is that an agent can quit the system before the system reaches the final state. In this case new path are added including such actions.
- The stoping condition is either an agreement reached among the negotiating agents in the sense that a compromise solution is accepted or the negotiation limits are exceeded and the system randomly imposes a solution (an efficient path of the negotiation graph).

## Related work

In distributed planning field the other works consider either that agents are completely cooperative or that agents are self-motivated without global goal. The difference with our work is that we consider that agents accomplish local goals necessary for global goal achievement trying simultaneously to optimize private goals. More precisely, the originality of our work compared to the multiagent cooperative problem solving (Durfee and Lesser, 87; Decker, 95; Ephrati, Pollack and Rosenschein, 95) where agents identify their private goals with their local goals, is that our agents make the difference between these two types of goals and can take out individual benefice, as much as possible, from a situation where they work for a common goal. Compared to (Ephrati and Rosenschein, 93b) where non-benevolent agents should be motivated to contribute to the global goal (should be paid for their work) in our work, agents can simultaneously take in to account several private

goals. The level of satisfaction of these goals depends on their negotiation ability with others. Another interesting point related to the other works (for example the cost in Zlotkin et Rosenschein, 91; Ephrati and Rosenschein, 93b), when the best plan is computed according to a single criterion, is that in our work, this computation is made according to several criteria. In the conflict resolution field, conflicts and positive interactions are addressed within a unified framework as in (Ephrati and Rosenschein, 93b). Compared to Sycara(89) and Martial (92) where negotiation is made through a persuader or coordinator, in our work, our agents do negotiate directly. Grosz and Kraus (93) develop a Shared-Plan model for collaborative activities where conflicting intentions are avoided instead of trying to resolve them. In (Zlotkin et Rosenschein 89; Zlotkin et Rosenschein, 91) where agents are considered either as fully-cooperative or not-at-all cooperative. The most important aspect of our work is that while other authors choose to impose a priori a multicriteria model (implicitly or explicitly) we consider that this can be negotiated (for instance accept or not trade-offs). Moreover in our approach the multicriteria model is not fixed, since everything can be negotiated including the criteria set and the set of possible actions. Finally the graph representation gives an explicit representation of the agents difficulty to compare plans which correspond to paths.

### Conclusion and open problems

In this paper a multicriteria approach for distributed planning and conflict resolution in a multiagent system context is outlined. The basic innovation consists in introducing a multicriteria graph representation of agent plans and the use of a multicriteria model for negotiation purposes. Other innovations are that private and local goals do not necessarily coincide in a cooperative work and that agents can negotiate everything including the criteria set of multicriteria model used to evaluate the paths, the set of possible actions or even the model itself. Of course the problems open by our approach are more than the ones solved. The question of computing the best paths in the individual graphs and the negotiation graph is by-passed, while it represents a big technical problem since very few efficient algorithms exist in the literature for this purpose. Another point related to our approach, which will be introduced in our future work, is the problem of interleaving of planning and execution in the case of a not foreseen event arrival (for instance in our example the arrival of a new agent). And this in order to preserve, by the new planning-negotiation-execution cycle, the effects of already executed actions.

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